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THE PRIVATE PRISON
DILEMMA
by ADRIANA BALLINES

I

n September 2009, Tanya Guzman-Martinez, a transgender woman, was
placed in removal proceedings and held for eight months at the Eloy Detention Center.1 Eloy Detention Center is a private prison operated by Corrections Corporations of America (“CCA”), the largest private-prison corporation
in the United States.2
Despite her requests for protection, Guzman-Martinez was placed in the male
housing unit.3 There, she was subjected to verbal abuse and harassment, was
patted down by male officers, and was forced by a CCA officer to perform
sexual acts.4 Guzman-Martinez filed a lawsuit against CCA, but her case was
dismissed.5 She re-filed her case in August of 2012.6
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THE GROWTH

OF

PRIVATE PRISONS

In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security spent a record-high, $2 billion, in tax dollars on detaining immigrants.7Approximately 34,000 immigrants are detained every night.8 Like Guzman-Martinez, about half of these
detained immigrants are held in privately run prisons.9
Since the opening of the first private prison in 1984, the industry has expanded rapidly throughout both state and federal corrections.10 Supporters of
prison privatizations argue that the significant cost savings that private prisons
purport to offer - lower wage and benefit costs for labor, lower procurement
costs, and more efficient administration and operation – warrant their continued growth.11 However, a recent nationwide research study indicated that “average savings from prison privatization was only about 1 percent, rather than
the projected 20-percent savings.”12
Moreover, in the last decade, “the three largest corporations with stakes in
immigration detention,” CCA, the GEO Group, and Management and Training Co. together spent “at least $45 million. . .on campaign donations and
lobbyists at the state and federal level.”13
Several sources suggest a correlation between campaign contributions and lobbying, and an increase in profits and contracts with US Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). For example, between 1999 and 2009, CCA
alone spent $18,002,000 on federal lobbying.14 “Of its 43 lobbying disclosures
[filed between 2008 and 2010]. . . only five do not expressly state [an] intent. . . to. . . influence immigration reform policy. . .”15 In 2010, CCA reported a gross revenue of $1.7 billion.16
The correlation “is definitely not coincidental” said Alexis Perlmutter, acting
director of policy for the National Immigrant Justice Center.17 “I think [private prison corporations] lobby to make more money, and they have been very
good at it up to this point.”18 The result is an “incarceration rate that is not
justified legally with the realities of immigrant detainees,” said the Assistant
Director at UC Davis Immigration Law Clinic, Holly S. Cooper.19
This is problematic because, as the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the
Human Rights of Migrant, François Crépeau, explains, “the level of accounta-
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bility and the level of transparency that are required for proper supervision of
detention facilities are usually not present in the case of privately-run corporations. When you have a private corporation with its profit-generating bottom
line, you have a significant interference with public policy outcomes,” said
Crépeau .20 For instance, in 2011 CCA “lobbied heavily against a bill that
would force them to comply with the same open records requirements governing public facilities.”21
DETENTION CONDITIONS

In a report published in May, 2012, the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) of Georgia interviewed 68 immigrant detainees and visited four different immigrant detention facilities under investigation.22 Three of the four
facilities visited, including Stewart, North Georgia Detention Center
(NGDC), and Irwin, were privately run prisons. Stewart and NGDC are both
managed by CCA, while Irwin is operated by Detention Management, LLC.23
Stewart had the highest deportation rate in the country – at 98.8%.24 Yet, only
two out of the 28 detainees interviewed at Stewart had legal representation.25
“[B]ecause the majority of immigrant detainees are housed in facilities in rural
locations far away from their homes,” legal representation for them is scarce
and cost-prohibitive.26
In response to the report, Steve Owen, CCA spokesman and operator of Stewart and the NGDC, said that “ACLU ignored or underplayed CCA responses
to some of the criticisms of its facilities.”27 “Some of the allegations were unsubstantiated or incorrect,” argued Owen.28
“I wouldn’t say that detainees are more at risk of human rights abuses” in
private prisons, said Perlmutter.29 In fact, those prisons “could be doing things
better” but it is difficult to know because it is “very challenging to find out
information from them without suing.”30
ALTERNATIVES

TO

DETENTION

While detaining an individual costs the US government about $166 per day,
more humane and efficient alternatives to detention (“ATD”) cost only about
$8.88 per day.31 Yet, the Obama administration requested only $111.59 mil-
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lion for ATD for fiscal year 2013.32 This amount is much lower than the
$2.026 billion that the U.S. House of Representatives appropriated for the
detention of immigrants.33
“We encounter people all the time who do not need to be detained,” said
Perlmutter.34 Perlmutter explains that “Congress determines the immigration
detention bed space every year, the problem is that DHS interprets this number as a mandatory requirement that they have to hold in custody.”35
In fact, when the Director of Intergovernmental Affairs, Cecilia Muñoz, was
asked whether it was true that ICE agents who do not meet the goal of deporting 400,000 individuals every year pay a very high price in Washington,” she
responded, “Congress passes the laws, appropriates the funds for implementing
the laws, and the federal agency’s job is to do what Congress has told them to
do. That is how a democracy works.”36
“There are two elements that affect the lack of use of ATD,” explained Crépeau. One is that “ATD are not sufficiently developed.”37 The other element is
“the fact that irregular migrants are not a political constituency. [Thus], politicians are not incentivized to protect them, and this is a structural failure of our
democracies.”38 Because the courts are not subject to the same electoral pressure, “access to the justice system for migrants is extremely important.”39
The case of Guzman-Martinez exemplifies many of the difficulties that individuals and attorneys face when seeking legal remedies against private-prisons
corporations. As Cooper explained, “the weakness of private prisons is the lack
of transparency and the fact that they are using their resources to advocate for
increased incarceration rates.”40
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37 Crépeau, supra note 20.
38 Id.
39 Id.
40 Cooper, supra note 6.

83

Published by LAW eCommons, 2012

5

